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ABSTRACT 
The almost inevitable midterm election loss suffered by 
the president's congressional party still lacks a complete 
explanation. It is argued here that the policy positions of the 
president help shape voters' perceptions of the positions of 
congressional candidates. Because the president implements policies 
before the midterm campaign begins, and because he has goals apart 
from winning seats in Congress, his party's candidates are at a 
disadvantage, relative to their opponents, in communicating the 
most favorable positions possible to their voters. This model of 
the midterm campaign not only explains midterm losses, but also 
accounts for rare failures of this phenomenon, as occurred in 1934. 
THE INHERENT DISADVANTAGE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PARTY 
IN MIDTERM CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
Randall L. Calvert and R. Mark Isaac 
The almost inevitable midterm election loss suffered by 
the president's congressional party is by now an accepted fact 
among political scientists and politicians. However, the factors 
which underlie midterm losses are still hazy and several explanations 
are current. In two recent efforts, Kernell [1977] attributes off­
year outcomes to asymmetries of behavior on the part of voters, 
while Tufte [1978] focuses on economic cycles induced by the 
government. The classic model is that of Campbell [1960] who 
posits that the weakness of short-term forces in a midterm election 
causes low-involvement voters from the previous on-year contest to 
abstain. In this paper we suggest that, because of certain strategic 
and informational considerations, the congressional candidates of 
the president's party have an inherent disadvantage in off-year 
elections independent of nonvoting patterns and particular issues. 
Because of incompleteness in the other explanations, we consider 
this systematic bias against the incumbent president's party to be 
a significant addition to the explanation of the midterm phenomenon. 
Kernell posits that voters react more strongly to negative 
than to positive impressions of the administration's performance. 
As a result, voters in the low-stimulus midterm election are 
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disproportionately those who in effect cast a vote of no confidence 
against the president's party. Kernell convincingly documents this 
overrespresentation; without a doubt it contributes to the observed 
midterm outcomes. However, there is no good explanation as to � 
individuals should exhibit this "negative voting" behavior. 
Kernell cites psychological studies in which similar effects are 
observed, and from which corresponding theories of biased behavior 
are developed [Kernell, 1977, pp. 51-52] . Such theories are 
necessarily ad hoc, and require the rather mysterious assertion 
that people view the world as "a predominantly positive place." 
One might alternatively appeal to possible asymmetries in the 
information which reaches the voter through the media; this again 
might be motivated by the psychological theories referred to, given 
the economic proclivities of news organizations. These explanations, 
though, leave us unsatisfied as to the real nature of negative 
voting. It would be preferable to have some direct explanation in 
terms of the rational-choice or sociopsychological paradigms 
currently used to build most models of electoral behavior. If this 
is impossible, a serious weakness in those approaches to voter 
behavior will be apparent. Until negative voting can be rationalized 
in some manner, we hesitate to accept it as a basic tenet of voting 
behavior rather than as a result of some other underlying feature 
of the midterm campaign. 
The "political business cycle" approach of Tufte holds 
that demonstrable efforts by the government to pump up the economy 
at presidential election time result in a bust phase of the economic 
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cycle at the time of off-year elections. Economic rationales for 
voting decisions (see, for example, Tufte, 1975) then take over to 
explain the resulting turn against the president's party. Expanding 
of social security benefits or pressure on the Fed to increase the 
money supply may serve as explanations of recent coincidences of 
economic boom and presidential elections; however, the inescapable 
midterm losses have been observed since about 1860, when government 
intervention in the economy was of considerably less significance 
than it has been since the New Deal. Thus although such an 
explanation might be used to predict any increased tendency for the 
president to lose seats at midterm in recent years, the midterm 
effect would apparently be present without executive efforts to win 
reelection in on-years. We must search for a further explanation. 
The classic "surge and decline" thesis of Campbell held 
that the president's off-year losses were a direct result of his 
on-year gains. Short-term forces which are presumed to have swept 
the president into office in one election, along with a number of 
coattail-riding congressmen, subside by the midterm election, 
removing from the electorate those low-involvement voters who were 
previously mobilized in favor of the incumbent party. Theoretical 
weaknesses in this approach have been apparent, especially in the 
simplified model of the operation of short-term forces. In 
particular, Campbell asserts that the short-term forces can be 
viewed as, on balance, favoring one candidate or the other; a more 
complete model must take account of the effects of various short-
term forces upon different groups in the electorate. At any rate, 
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Arseneau and Wolfinger [1973] laid the concept to rest, at least as 
an explanation of midterm forces, when they showed that the involve-
ment-turnout relation for off-years has not continued to hold since 
1960. Since the midterm losses continue, surge and decline cannot 
have been their driving force. 
As an alternative attempt at accounting for the midterm 
effect, we appeal to (1) the imperfect information under which voters 
must make their decisions, and (2) the candidates' task of adopting 
a platform to win the midterm election. Voters may be thought of as 
basing their decisions on, broadly speaking, political "issues. " But 
to evaluate the issue stands of candidates a voter must exert time 
and effort to acquire information about them, where again we 
broadly define "information" to include any data or impressions about 
the candidate's positions, power, or even personality, and voters' 
understanding and expectations of the effects of an officholder's 
actions on the real world. Since the voter has other uses for his 
time and efforts, he may be expected to use any informational short-
cuts or rules of thumb which seem appropriate to him. We will argue 
here specifically that the well-publicized positions of the presi-
dent are used by voters to infer facts about the less accessible 
positions of congressional candidates who belong to the president's 
party. We will show that in off-year elections this type of voter 
behavior would represent an asymmetry in the campaign for 
congressional office which is likely to put the presidential party 
candidates at a disadvantage. 
We view the voter as having preferences over an issue 
space S in which positions G (presidential party) or '¥ (other party) 
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may be taken by candidates for U. S. Representative in the voter's 
district. A typical G or '¥ may include not only policies advocated 
by the candidates or by the incumbent administration, but also any 
valence "issues" [Stokes, 1963], personal characteristics and so on 
which may figure in such a campaign. Previous to the campaign, 
the voter receives information on the positions G and '¥ of the candi-
dates. Because this information (such as contained in news reports, 
transmitted in conversations, etc.) may be evaluated in different 
ways or may be inexact or even false, the voter uses it to create a 
priori subjective distributions f (G) and g ('JI) of the "true" positions 
of the candidates. Information received from the candidates in the 
campaign is used to update these priors.
1 
At the time of the vote 
decision, the voter uses his preferences over S and the distributions 
of probable candidate positions to determine which candidate is preferred. 
The goal of the candidate is to be elected. It is well-
known that congressmen (and presumably candidates) develop subjective 
estimates about the distributions of opinion within their districts 
(Fenno [1977] and Stokes and Miller [1963] offer differing 
demonstrations of this point); the use of modern public opinion 
survey techniques has recently lent further usefulness to these 
estimates. Given our broad concept of issues, we can think of the 
candidate as having some rough information about what his electoral 
fortunes will be if the voters perceive him as holding a particular 
set of issue positions. Let us represent this rough information as 
a likelihood-of-winning function L
i 
for the candidate in district i, 
which depends upon his position Gi and takes into account the possible 
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i . 2 i i 
� of his opponent. 8 and � are both elements of S, and L
i 
takes 
on values between zero and one. The candidate, in these terms, 
chooses his position e
i 
to maximize his chances of winning;
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call 




The task of the candidate in the 
campaign, then, is to use what resources he has to inform the 
voters that he indeed takes the issue positions denoted by �, 
because the voters are not certain beforehand. Given the 
uncertainties involved, voters in effect use information from the 
campaigns to update their beliefs rather than abandoning their 
prior beliefs completely; voters place more likelihood on and near 
i i 8 and � after f and g are updated. 
One more important actor appears in the campaign: the 
president himself. The presence of the chief executive, who not 
only advocates but is required to implement policy alternatives 
(defined as a position ¢ in the issue space) constitutes another 
set of campaign messages being sent to voters. In particular 
these messages are used by voters as further observations upon the 
i 
position 8 of the candidate of the president's party. Thus the 
likelihood-of-winning function must be written as L.(G
i
,¢) (for 1 
convenience we suppress the argument �
i
). Strong connections 
between a voter's evaluation of the president and his vote for 
congressman have been demonstrated in Kernell [1977] and Tufte [1975] 
for midterm elections; in addition, the phenomenon of coattail-
voting at the individual level [Miller, 1955] and the importance 
of association (endorsements, etc. ) between presidential and 
congressional candidates [Schoenberger, 1969] in on-year elections 
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indicate that evaluations of the presidential incumbent or candidate 
figure significantly in the voter's decision in the congressional race. 
Two general reasons can be given for expecting the effect 
of presidential evaluations to manifest itself in the evaluation of 
the congressional candidate, or, in terms of our model, for expecting 
¢ to be used to update voter beliefs about Gi. First, inasmuch as 
the president is viewed as a leader of his party in government, 
responsible for legislative proposals, his positions naturally 
influence and are influenced by those of his fellow party members. 
Implicit in this, as well as in the use of party label as a cue, 
is the requirement that voters perceive some amount of issue 
coherence in the parties. Such perceptions are demonstrated by the 
ability of many voters to verbally evaluate the parties by issue 
positions in survey responses [see, for example, Nie et al., 1976]. 
The second reason voters might attach importance to the president's 
position is the relative ease of obtaining information on the presi-
dent, compared with information on the congressional candidate. Any 
attention at all to news media exposes the voter to the actions and 
declarations of the president, allowing the voter to at least form 
an opinion of the president's proximity to the voter's own (however 
vague) preferred positions. Hence the president's positions should 
contribute heavily to the voter's .!! priori perception about one 
candidate. On the other hand, perceptions of the other candidate 
in an off-year election generally have no such component. Our main 
point is that the candidate of the president's party may therefore 
find it difficult to impress voters with his true position if it 
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differs from that of the president, whereas the opposing candidate 
has no such concern. As we will now demonstrate, this simple fact 
puts the incumbent party candidates at a disadvantage. 
Using the notation we have developed thus far, we can 
describe the midterm campaign in the following way: the president, 
through his actions while in office, first assumes an issue position 
<l>. Then, in district i, the candidate of the president's party 




respectively to maximize 
their chances of winning, given w.5 The presidential party candidate, 
in particular, wishes to 
i 
maxL.(e ,<l>) . l 
e1 
where the action of his opponent is implicit in L
i 
and in the choice 
of e
i
. The process of signalling to the voters, as described 
above, ensues. 
Were the president's message not received by the voters, 
-i -i only the optimal messages e and � would be received by voters 





) . l 
e1 
and similarly for '¥
i
. The expected number of seats to be won by 
the president's party would then be 
\' -i \' i l L. (e ) = l max L. (e ) • l . . l 
i l e1 
If this were the case, the president's party would suffer no 
inherent disadvantage at midterm. However, the president's importance 
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to the voters is inescapable; accordingly, suppose the president 
* 
chose <l> = ¢ to maximize the number of seats won, i.e. 





The candidates' maximizing choices would in general be e1 F c? and 
"* . 
�1 J '¥1 given the president's choice <l>*. Since, in the typical 
election, voter preference distributions differ greatly from district 
to district, many of the presidential party's candidates will 
experience nonoptimal messages from the chief executive in their 
individual districts. In normal times, the voter priors f and g 
place considerable weight on positions near e
i 
and �i. the actual 
positions assumed by the candidates. The president's messages, then, 
simply cause the updated f's to place less weight near the 
candidates' optima than would otherwise be the case. Hence the 
presidential party candidates' likelihoods-of-winning will overall 
be lower, and the number of seats won will be less, than if the 
president did not figure in the campaign at all; that is: 
IL. cei* ,w*> < IL. cei). 
i l i l 
In fact, having concerns and objectives apart from the 
fortunes of his party in Congress (for example, his own reelection 
or constraints from promises during the previous election campaign}, 
- * 
the president will choose some <l> / <l> • This suboptimal choice makes 
his congressional candidates even worse off; they choose ei, and 
their opponents �
i
' to maximize their chances in the face of <l>. 
The presidential party's expected number of seats is then 
I Li <e\ ¢>. 
i 
In the typical off-year election, we thus find 
-i - i* * i LL.(G ,<!>) < LL.(G ,<!>) < LL.(G ), 
i 
1 i 1 i 1 
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that is, the presidential party's candidates are worse off overall 
than they would be if the president sent no messages in the campaign. 
Since the latter is the hypothetical case in which both party's 
candidates are on equal footing, we have showed that the presidential 
party is faced with an inherent disadvantage in winning seats in the 
midterm election. 
Given the imperfect information of voters and the nature 
of political coalitions in individual districts,
6 
our model clearly 
does not predict that the president's party will lose every seat, 
nor even that it will lose control of Congress. If the opinion 
distributions of potential presidential-party voters were similar 
in enough districts, and if <!> were not too unfavorable nationwide, 
the disadvantage would be limited as would the net loss of seats. 
Indeed, these are the conditions which characterize most midterm 
elections. Under certain rare conditions, the president's power to 
communicate his party's positions to voters could even provide a 
net advantage for his party. Suppose that cataclysmic political 





which were previously considered unlikely positions; that 
is, most voters 1 priors placed very little weight near those positions. 
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It might be prohibitively expensive if not impossible for the 
candidates to effectively inform voters of their new positions. But 
the extra signalling ability of the president could provide his 
party with an advantage in moving those priors which would outweigh 
the disadvantage of their strategic immobility discussed above. 
In fact, the 1934 midterm elections may represent just 
such a case. Following the political upheaval of the early 
Depression years, many voters' prior distributions of candidates' 
positions were conceivably centered near pre-Depression optima, 
probably with greatly increased dispersions due to the seriousness 
of the nation's problems and the wide variety of solutions being 
proposed. President Roosevelt's aggressive leadership may have 
facilitated the efforts of a substantial number of Democratic 
candidates to achieve and transmit to voters the optima appropriate 
to the new economic and political situation. 
Our model suggests two other interesting interpretations. 
First, the occasional tendency of intense midterm campaigning by 
the president to do more harm than good [Key, 1964, pp. 565-567] may 
be explained by more than the possible resentment among the locals due 
to their perceptions that the president is "meddling" in their 
affairs. The president, by campaigning on some issues in a 
particular district, is generating potentially nonoptimal messages 
for other districts. In addition, he is tying the local candidate 
with the administration's overall issue position, which may 
be nonoptimal in that district. Secondly, notice that the often-
heard proposal for the opposition party to develop policy-specific 
national programs for all its candidates carries with it potential 
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disadvantages as well as benefits. If voters begin to evaluate the 
position of the opposition candidate's message �
i 
in conjunction 
with that of a nationwide platform or spokesman, the opposition 
party would then suffer the same sort of mobility disadvantage 
which now afflicts the president's party. The opposition party may 
well find that the informational problems of the lack of a national 
voice may be outweighed by the mobility advantages of being able 
to optimize �
i 
district by district. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Using a model in which (1) voters have imperfect information, 
and (2) voters infer information about a candidate's position from 
the president's position when both are of the same party, we have 
seen that the basic nature of the election contest between incumbent 
and challenger implies the existence of a tactical disadvantage for 
the presidential party candidate. This disadvantage stems from 
two facts. First, the importance of the president as national 
executive and leader of his party means that his single position 
influences voter perceptions of his party's candidates in 435 
districts, although patterns of voter preferences in those districts 
will generally vary widely. Thus a presidential party candidate 
will have difficulty in convincing some voters that his true 
position is not the president's, but one which is more popular in 
the district. Second, the president has a multitude of goals and 
constraints which may prevent him even from choosing his single 
position to maximize the expected strength of his party in Congress. 
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In midterm elections, no outstanding national figure plays the role 
for the opposition party that the president plays in his own party; 
we therefore expect the presidential party to be at a relative 
disadvantage under normal circumstances. 
There are two important points to be made concerning the 
relationship between our model and the existing literature. First, 
the framework presented here allows us to obtain Tufte's thesis as 
a special case, in which one subset of the relevant issue space 
consists of economic policies and in which the president's actions 
(his choice of �) are colored by his own reelection considerations. 
The result of these economic policies, according to Tufte, is a 
sour economic situation at midterm with which the presidential party 
candidates are saddled in their campaigns. Thus our model expands, 
rather than contradicts, the insight in Tufte's work. 
Second, any model which purports to explain the "general" 
phenomenon of midterm losses should leave room for the well-known 
counterexample of the 1934 elections. Previous theories can account 
for 1934 only in an essentially negative way. Surge-and-decline 
could be invoked only if there were no 1934 decline or no 1932 surge 
in voter involvement; it gives little insight into the reason for 
these absences. Negative voting would allow off-year gains only 
if presidential popularity were higher at midterm than two years 
previous, but it fails to explain why this should occur so rarely. 
Our model not only accommodates the 1934 elections, but in fact 
presents a description of the world which explains � the Demo-
crats gained seats and what conditions could bring about a similar 
anomaly in the future. 
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NOTES 
1. This is a Bayesian model of voter evaluations. In general such 
updating can be represented as follows. Let f(0) be the� 
priori distribution of 0 and let W be a random variable 
representing the message to be received. Suppose W has the 
conditional density function h(wJ0) and marginal density h1 (w). 
The updated, or posterior, distribution of the candidate's 






, and f are all known to the voter beforehand. 
This equation is known as Bayes' theorem. 
2. The likelihoods-of-winning. should be thought of in the most general 
possible terms. They may be asymmetric, i.e., the candidate of 
one party need not get the same likelihood-of-winning with 
position 0 that the other party's candidate would get at that same 
position. This freedom allows the L. in each district to take i 
into account such things as the differing constituencies of two 
candidates within a district in Fenno's [1977] sense; the (related) 
ability of a candidate to communicate his positions to some 
groups but not, perhaps, to others; and the political history of 
a district, including personal backgrounds of particular candidates. 
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3. There are several important special cases of this decision 
problem. If the presidential party's candidate is forced to 
make his decision before his opponent does so, he may be 
'* 
viewed as choosing a maxmin strategy 0
i 
against his opponent 




). If on the other i 
hand his opponent has already chosen W, the candidate will 
simply choose 0
i 
to maximize L. (0
i
,W). More generally we may i 
assume that the decisions are in effect made simultaneously, 
and that our·candidate estimates a subjective distribution 
H(�) of the position his opponent will take. Then we might 
view the decision problem as maximizing E[L(0
i
,�)] 
./'L(0i,�)dH(�) with respect to 0i. 
i 
suppress the argument � • 
In the sequel we will 
Aranson et al. [1974] give conditions under which 
maximization of Li is equivalent in effect to various forms of 
plurality maximization and vote maximization. 
4. Formally, there is of course the problem of existence and 
uniqueness of such a strategy. Straightforward assumptions 
about continuity of L
i 
and compactness of S yield existence in 
the expected value formulation of note 3; the situation is even 
simpler for the sequential choice situations. For the maxmin 
situation, the fact that the L
i 
sum to unity means that the 
problem always has a solution in mixed strategies (it is a two-
person zero-sum game), but mixed strategies are not well de.fin.ed 
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in our model of the campaign. Existence of an optimal pure 
strategy in this sense is not assured. However, we require that 
the candidates do choose positions, which seems reasonable in 
the present context. Given only that they are attempting in 
some approximate sense to maximize Li
, the argument of this 
paper still applies. Finally, given this requirement that a 
choice be made, the uniqueness question does not affect our 
argument either, since one of the optima is chosen by some 
criterion, be it random or whatever. 
5. In practice we may observe the president being pinned down on 
only a subset of issues prior to the midterm campaign, or being 
restricted to a subset of the possible positions on an issue. 
Also, he may advocate policies with particularized benefits for 
individual districts when campaigning for those districts' candi-
dates. These distinctions are not crucial to our model, since 
in any case the presdent's position willbe constrained to some 
extent on several issues before the congressional candidates 
begin campaigning. 
Notice that the constraining of the president's platform 
prior to the choice of �i by the opposition means yet another 
disadvantage for his party's candidates. Because of the 
connection between voters' perceptions of � and Gi, the candi-
dates are to a certain extent also constrained prior to the 
campaign. Downs [1957, pp. 55-62] examines a simple model of 
this phenomenon, demonstrating the advantage of choosing an 
17 
opposition platform. More generally this phenomenon results 
from the almost certain presence of majority rule cycles in S 
(see, e.g. Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook [1970]; Hoyer and 
Mayer [1975]). Kramer [1975] analyzes the dynamic behavior of 
an electoral system under these conditions. 
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